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Several states have recently enacted legislation regulating dredge
and fill operations in certain classes of nonnavigable waters. Professor
Ausness examines some of the decisions arising under these acts to
determine if any distinguishable trend has emerged regarding the nature
and extent of constitutional limitations on the regulation of such ac-
tivities.
A SURVEY OF STATE REGULATION OF
DREDGE AND FILL OPERATIONS IN
NONNAVIGABLE WATERS
Robert C. Ausness*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE common law of England based public and private
rights in natural waterbodies on the concept of naviga-
bility:' Beds under nonnavigable waters were subject to pri-
vate ownership' but the sovereign held title to the beds of navi-
gable waterbodies in trust for the common use and benefit of
the people.' Structures erected on such beds were deemed to
be purprestures and could be seized or destroyed by the gov-
ernment.4
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968,
University of Florida; Member of Florida Bar. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Marjorie D. Gradarian (J.D., Florida 1972)
in the preparation of this article.
1. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1960).
2. MOORE, HISTORY AND LAW OF THE FORESHORE AND SEASHORE 639 (3d ed.
1888).
3. See MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION-THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 122.1(b), at 853 (1968). [Hereinafter cited as
MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN.]
4. See 1 Anne, Ch. 7, § 5 (1702).
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In America, the states succeeded to the Crown's interest
in the beds of navigable waterbodies.5 In addition to the servi-
tude imposed upon navigable waters by powers of Congress
under the commerce clause, the United States Supreme Court
declared that the beds under such waters were held by the
states in trust for the protection of navigation and other pub-
lic purposes.' The majority of state courts have subscribed
to the trust doctrine,7 while a minority have taken the posi-
tion that a state may convey title to such lands subject to a
public right of navigation.'
Most states have utilized the public trust doctrine or their
authority over commerce and navigation to sustain regulation
over dredging and filling in navigable waters' but until lately
control over such operations in nonnavigable waters has been
left to private remedies based upon theories of nuisance and
riparian rights. ° In recent years, however, due to the scarcity
of suitable land for residential and commercial construction,
developers have increasingly resorted to the creation of arti-
ficial sites by filling along lakes, wetlands and coastal areas.1
Although the state retains sufficient power to control such
practices in indisputably navigable waters, governmental au-
thority is less certain in nonnavigable waters or where pri-
vately owned submerged lands are concerned.
Since some dredge and fill operations cause ecological
harm, 2 a strong state regulatory program is desirable regard-
5. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Comment, Water
Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52 CAiF. L. REv. 171, 172
(1964).
6. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
7. E.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893);
State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709
(1948); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); Baker v.
Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W. 413 (1935).
8. E.g., Turk v. Wilson's Heirs, 266 Ky. 78, 98 S.W.2d 4 (1936); California
Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1953); Hogue v. Glover, 302 S.W.2d
757 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
9. Bartke, Dredging, Filling and Flood Plain Regulation in Michigan, 17
WAYNE: L. REv. 859 (1971).
10. To date few decisions have clearly distinguished between the two theories.
See Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RES. J. 1, 50 (1967).
11. The public trust doctrine prevents alienation of submerged lands under
navigable waters. Many states, however, by common law right or statutory
enactment, have granted limited rights to riparians to fill out to the chan-
nel or to a bulkhead line. Sometimes these submerged lands were granted
outright to the riparian owners and sometimes they must be purchased.
12. See Note, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. REv. 240
(1970).
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less of whether or not the waters involved are navigable. Rec-
ognizing this fact, several states have recently enacted legis-
lation under their police power to control such activities in
certain classes of nonnavigable waters.'" To date most regula-
tion of dredge and fill operations has been limited to coastal
wetland areas and the scope of such legislation has generally
been restricted to the protection of marine fisheries and simi-
lar ecological considerations.
While such objectives may not be relevant to landlocked
states, similar legislation might justifiably regulate dredging
and filling in nonnavigable lakes and water-courses,14 and
may concern itself with the protection of water quality, con-
servation of fish and wildlife, flood control or recreation."
The encouragement of urban development along planned line.
might also be promoted. With this objective in view, this
article will survey several representative regulatory acts and
examine cases arising under them. 6 These decisions will be
carefully reviewed to determine if any distinguishable trend
has emerged regarding the nature and extent of constitutional
limitations on dredge and fill regulation.
II. PRIVATE LAW CONTROLS OvER NONNAVIGABLE WATERS
The concept of riparian rights provides the primary basis
for control over the use of privately owned submerged beds.
In speaking of riparian rights, 7 however, it is necessary to
distinguish between those exercised over navigable and non-
navigable waters. Riparian rights in navigable waters accrue
13. See note 45 infr'a. Some of these statutes are discussed in section III of this
article.
14. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:1 (1968).
15. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:1-b (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art.
66C, § 718 (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4702 (Supp. 1972) ; CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 66601 (West Supp. 1971).
16. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission, 11 Cal. App. 3d 577, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) ; Maine
v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Johnson v. Maine Wetlands Control
Board, 250 A.2d 825 (Me. 1969); Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth,
265 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1970); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S.
Volpe & Co., Inc., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
17. Because of its Latin origin, the term "riparian" is perhaps more properly
applied to watercourses than to lakes and the term "littoral" is sometimes
used in connection with the latter. However, in this article the term
"riparian" will be used in either context since the property rights in both
types of waterbodies are similar in most respects.
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by virtue of ownership of upland bordering on such waters 18
they traditionally include access 9 and the right to make rea-
sonable consumptive uses of the water.2" In addition, ripar-
ians share privileges of fishing, bathing, and navigation in
common with the general public.2 Similar consumptive use
rights are normally possessed by those whose upland property
borders on nonnavigable waters22 although fishing, bathing,
and navigation rights may depend on whether the riparian
owns a portion of the bed itself.2" The submerged beds of non-
navigable waterbodies are subject to private ownership in the
same manner as other real property, and in most jurisdictions
the public has no rights in such waters. 4 In absence of special
circumstances, the title of landowners along nonnavigable
streams extends to the thread of the stream.2" For the most
part, the amount of submerged land owned is dependent on
the frontage possessed by the riparian owners.2" Apparently
no cases have arisen concerning a common law right of one
18. MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN § 21, at 31; 1 CLARK, WATERS & WATER RIGHTS
§16 (1967).
19. See 1 FARNHAM, THE LAW OP WATERS & WATER RIGHTS §66 (1904); Annots.,
21 A.L.R. 206 (1922), 15 A.L.R.2d 213, 318 (1951).
20. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' &
Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 402, 48 So. 643, 644 (1909); Bouris v. Largent,
94 Ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 15 (1968); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60,
148 N.W. 617 (1914); Barakis v. American Cyanamid Co., 161 F. Supp. 25
(N.D. Tex. 1958).
21. Baker v. State ex rel. Jones, 87 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1956); Brickell v. Tram-
mell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919) ; Witke v. State Conservation Comm'n,
244 Iowa 261, 56 N.W.2d 582 (1953); Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7
N.W.2d 342 (1942).
22. Brummund v. Vogel, 184 Neb. 415, 168 N.W.2d 24 (1969); MALONEY, PLAGER
& BALDWIN §22.1(a), at 35.
23. Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890); Miller v. Lutheran
Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 200 A. 646 (1938) ; Beach v. Hayner,
207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1052 (1920).
24. Osceola County v. Triple E. Development Co., 90 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1956)
Patton Park, Inc. v. Pollak, 115 Ind. App. 32, 55 N.E.2d 328 (1944) ; Winans
Lake Hill Corp. v. Moon, 284 Mich. 688, 280 N.W. 81 (1938) ; Taylor Fishing
Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
25. See Maloney & Plager, Florida's Streams-Water Rights in a Water Won-
derland, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 294 (1957). The presumption could be rebutted
by the calls of the deed. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 597 (1931). "The 'thread of
the stream,' when called for as a boundary line of private estates, is the
middle line between shores, irrespective of the depth of the channel, taking
them in the natural and ordinary stage of the water, at medium height,
neither swollen by freshets nor shrunk by droughts." State v. Muncie
Pulp Co., 119 Tenn. 47, 78, 104 S.W. 437, 445 (1907).
26. Knight v. Wilder, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 199, 48 Am. Dec. 660 (1848); Clark v.
Campau, 19 Mich. 324 (1869); Cordovana v. Vipond, 198 Va. 353, 94 S.E.2d
295 (1956); Lambert's Point Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 113 Va. 270, 74
S.E. 156 (1912). The judicial rules for apportionment are not absolute, but
are subject to variation where equity demands. See Groner v. Foster, 94 Va.
650, 27 S.E. 493 (1897).
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riparian owner to prohibit another from filling submerged
land under nonnavigable streams or tidal areas adjacent to
his riparian upland.
In the case of nonnavigable lakes riparians usually own
to the center,27 but special rules have evolved with respect to
the rights of boating, swimming and fishing on the surface
of the lake.2" The common law position restricts each riparian
owner to the use of the water immediately over his portion of
the bed and treats any intrusion thereon as a trespass.2" In
states" adhering to the common law view, the right to exclu-
sive possession would presumably enable each owner to fill his
portion of the bed unless such operation constituted a private
nuisance. 1 A similar view apparently prevails in some of
those western states which do not recognize riparian rights.22
It is obvious, therefore, that the common law rule provides
little basis for regulation. At the other extreme some New
England states have recognized public recreational rights in
all "great ponds" regardless of navigability.2 This approach
27. Scheifert v. Briegel, 90 Minn. 125, 96 N.W. 44 (1903); Richardson v. Sims,
118 Mass, 728, 80 So. 4 (1918) ; Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E.
437 (1923); Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890).
28. Many states have rejected title to the bed as controlling and have focused
on the suitability of a body of water for recreational use. Some states
have only gone so far as to permit common use among riparians and their
licensees. Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Ct. App.
1960); Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960) ; Monroe
v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946). Other states allow recreational
use by anyone who may gain access without trespassing on the uplands.
D'Albora v. Garcia, 144 So. 2d 911 (La. Ct. App. 1962) ; Kerley v. Wolfe,
349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957) ; State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis
Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940) ; Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,
269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904);
State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) ; Luscher
v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936) ; State v. Malmquist, 114 Vt.
96, 40 A.2d 534 (1944) ; Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145
N.W. 816 (1914); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
29. Note, Extent of Private Rights on Nonnavigable Lakes, 5 U. FLA. L. REV.
166, 176 (1952).
30. Sanders v. De Rose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934); Walden v. Pines
Lake Land Co., 126 N. J. Eq. 249, 8 A.2d 581 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Mix
v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y.S. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Akron Canal & Hy-
draulic Co. v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio App. 93, 50 N.E.2d 897 (1943); Smoulter
v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 A. 144 (1904) ; cf. Leonard v. Pearce, 348 Ill. 518
181 N.E. 399 (1932) ; State v. West Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W.
746 (1913).
31. Private Rights, supra note 29, at 166.
32. Johnson & Morry, Filling and Building on Small Lakes-Time for Judicial
and Legislative Controls, 45 WASH. L. REV. 27, 35 (1970).
33. In Massachusetts, the Great Pond Ordinance of 1641 provided that recrea-
tional rights in certain bodies of water could not be privately owned. Water
Recreation, supra, note 5, at 174. See Percy Summer Club v. Welch, 66 N.H.
180, 28 A. 22 (1890) ; New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt.
338, 55 A. 323 (1896).
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would seemingly limit or exclude altogether any private right
to fill. Wisconsin has adopted a version of the public trust
doctrine which prohibits filling in privately owned navigable
waters without state permission." Other states take a middle
course and subscribe to the civil law or common use approach.3
The civil law allows the owner of a portion of the bed to use
the surface of the entire lake for fishing, boating and
swimming as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with
the rights of other proprietors.3 6
The effect of civil law rule on the right to fill is presently
uncertain since only two decisions have specifically dealt with
this problem. 7 In Burt v. Munger,"8 the owner of a portion
of the bed of a nonnavigable lake was denied the right to fill
a 50-by-150 foot portion of the lake bottom or to construct a
cement retaining wall on the bed a few feet from the water's
edge. The court did not elaborate a rationale for its decision
but noted, "The result of such action would be to increase the
extent of plaintiff's land on the shore, at the expense of the
lake and defendant's rights therein. "" Since the state was a
civil law jurisdiction, the fill would have interfered with the
riparians' rights to travel over the entire lake surface, but
the court failed to indicate whether the proposed fill inter-
fered with an easement right on the part of other riparian
owners or whether it was an unreasonable use under the ripar-
ian rights doctrine.
The "reasonableness" test has long been employed as a
limitation of the exercise of rights to consumptive uses,4" and
34. Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898); Muench v.
Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1952). WIs.
STAT. ANN. §§30.11-.13 (Supp. 1969).
35. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Duval v. Thomas,
114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487
(1919) ; Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960); State
Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940);
Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) (nonnavigable stream);
Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956); Improved Realty
Corp. v. Sowers, 195 Va. 317, 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953); But see Wickauski v.
Swift, 203 Va. 467, 124 S.E.2d 892 (1962). See also Taylor Fishing Club v.
Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
36. Johnson & Morry, eupra note 32, at 38.
37. Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich, 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946); Bach v. Sarich, 74
Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
38. 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946).
39. Id. at 664, 23 N.W.2d at 120.
40. Harris v. Brook, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Lake Gibson Land
Co. v. Lester, 102 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
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has been adopted more recently as a restriction on recreational
uses as well. 1 Under this approach, no riparian use is neces-
sarily unreasonable.2 A recent Washington decision, Bach v.
Sarich," utilized the riparian reasonable use rule in a dredge
and fill case. In the Bach case a riparian owner sought to
construct an apartment building on the bed of Bitter Lake,
a small nonnavigable lake in Seattle, Washington. The plain-
tiffs, also riparian owners, sought to enjoin the proposed con-
struction on the theory that the civil law rule gave each ripar-
ian owner an easement-type interest over the entire lake
surface. The trial court entered judgment on behalf of the
plaintiffs and this was upheld by the Washington Supreme
Court. Despite the enactment of a zoning regulation designat-
ing the defendant's portion of the bed for apartment use, the
court held that the apartment was not a riparian use, and
therefore was unreasonable per se. The court declared:
Mere proximity of the apartment to the water does
not render it a riparian use. With respect to a struc-
ture, such a use must be so intimately associated with
the water that apart from the water its utility would
be seriously impaired.4
Under this so-called related use approach the court must
decide whether or not a proposed use is riparian or not before
it can consider the question of reasonableness. In the case of
dredge and fill operations there is still a great deal of latitude;
operations associated with the exercise of the traditional ri-
parian rights of fishing, bathing, navigation and the like
would presumably be considered riparian uses by the courts
and would therefore be permitted if they were otherwise rea-
sonable. However, as in the Bach case, dredging or filling in
connection with the construction of apartment buildings or
the subdivision of land for residential use might be prohibited.
41. See Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So 2d 305 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960);
Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
42. Johnson v. Morry, supra note 32, at 41. In Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667,
154 N.W.2d 473 (1967), the court outlined a three-step procedure to be
followed when determining the reasonableness of a proposed use: first,
ascertain the nature of the lake; second, assess the character and degree
of the use itself; and third, evaluate the consequential effects, including
benefits and detriments on the interests of other riparians.
43. 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
44. Id. at 579, 445 P.2d at 651.
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The question arises of whether the related use test is an
appropriate land use control device. Like other doctrines of
real property law, it may balance competing private interests
satisfactorily, but like most private remedies, is one-dimen-
sional and seldom allows considerations of public policy to
operate in individual cases. Nor can it be said as a matter of
optimum land use that a riparian use is necessarily desirable
or that a nonriparian use is inherently undesirable. To put it( nother way, the question of riparianism is not the sole criter-
on of sound land use policy. Whatever its merits as a doctrine
of real property, the related use test, and indeed the civil law
rule itself, is an inadequate substitute for public regulation
where recreational, ecological or other public matters are con-
cerned. For this reason a legislative regulatory approach
should be examined.
III. LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS
A number of states have recently started to regulate
dredge and fill operations within wetland areas." Most of this
legislation falls into the same pattern: a state agency is given
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to control
dredging and filling in wetland areas regardless of naviga-
bility ;4" landowners are required to secure the permission of
state4" and sometimes also local authorities" before they may
commence dredge and fill operations in such areas. A public
hearing is normally required 9 and provision is made for ju-
dicial review.5" The legislation frequently specifies that the
45. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§66600-66610 (West Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-136 to -- 147 (Supp. 1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§4701-09
(Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§718-31 (1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 130, §105 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §113-229 (Cum. Supp. 1971); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:1 to :5 (1968); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW §§429-a to -g
(McKinney 1967);,.R,I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-46.1-1 (1956).
46. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §722 (1970); MASS. ANN LAWS ch. 130, §105
(1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:4-a (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§113-230(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
47. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §721 and §726 (1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 130, §27A (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §113-229(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §11-46.1-1 (1956).
48. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §66632(a) (West Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§4701-4709 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, §27A (1972).
49. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, §27A (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-
A:2 (Supp. 1971).
50. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:4 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art.
66C, §728 (1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, §27A (1972).
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court shall determine whether the administrative action de-
prives the landowner of such use of his property as to consti-
tute a taking thereof. 1
It is worth noting that Maryland and New Hampshire
differ somewhat from this model. While most regulatory
legislation avoids the issue of navigability in dealing with
privately owned submerged lands, the Maryland Wetlands
Act 2 departs from this approach by dividing wetlands into
public and private areas, and applying more stringent regu-
lation to the former. 8 New Hampshire has enacted compre-
hensive dredge and fill regulatory legislation that goes beyond
wetland protection. 4 The act originally applied only to tidal
areas,55 but was amended in 1969 to include Great Ponds and
lakes of ten acres or more, all surface waters of the state,
whether navigable or not,56 and any swamp or bog subject to
periodic flooding by fresh water. 7
A. Massachusetts
In 1963 Massachusetts enacted one of the first statutes to
regulate on a statewide basis dredging and filling in coastal
wetland areas. 8 The legislation currently declares:
No person shall remove, fill or dredge any bank, flat,
marsh, meadow or swamp bordering on coastal waters
without written notice of his intention to so remove,
fill or dredge to the board of selectmen in a town or
to the appropriate licensing authority in a city, to the
state department of public works, and to the director
of marine fisheries. 9
The statute further requires the local authorities to hold a
hearing on the proposed operation and submit recommenda-
tions to the Director.6 If the area in question contains shell-
51. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:4(II) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,
§725 (1970).
52. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§718-731 (1970).
53. Id. §719.
54. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§483-A:1 to 5 (1968).
55. Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).
56. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§483-A:1-a (Supp. 1971).
57. Id.
58. MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 426 (1963).
59. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 130, §27A (1972).
60. Id.
1973
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fish or is necessary to protect marine fisheries, the Director
may impose conditions on the project.6
In 1965 the Director was given additional authority to
adopt, amend, modify or repeal orders regulating, restricting
or prohibiting dredging and filling in coastal wetlands.62
Coastal wetlands, as defined in the act, include:
[A]ny bank, marsh, swamp, meadow, flat or other
low land subject to tidal action or coastal storm flow-
age and such contiguous land as the commissioner
reasonably deems necessary to affect by any such
order in carrying out the purposes of this section.6"
Any landowner affected by an order of the Director may bring
suit in the superior court to determine whether the order so
restricts the use of his property as to deprive him of the
practical uses thereof and constitutes an unreasonable exer-
cise of the police power and a taking without compensation.64
If the court agrees with the landowner's contention, it will
invalidate the order as to his property. Thereupon the Direc-
tor may elect to condemn a fee or lesser interest in the land
through the exercise of eminent domain.6"
To date, no appellate cases have arisen under the 1965
statute; however, the 1963 acts was held valid in Commissioner
of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co.66 and was also con-
strued in Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth.67 In ad-
dition, zoning regulations of similar import were twice con-
sidered by the court in MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of
Duxbury.6"
A classic review of the substantive due process issue was
provided by the court in the Volpe case. In 1960, S. Volpe &
Co. acquired approximately fifty acres within a 78 acre tract
61. Id.
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 768 (1965).
63. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, §105 (1972).
64. Id.
65. Id. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 691 (1970), amended the 1965 Act to provide that
funds allocated under MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 132A, §3 (1972), could be used
for this purpose. There does not appear to be source of funds for a taking
of property under the 1963 Act.
66. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
67. 265 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1970).
68. 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964), appeal after remand; 356 Mass. 635,
255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
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known as Broad Marsh, and three years later sent a written
notice to the appropriate state and local officials of its inten-
tion to dredge a channel and a basin into the marsh in connec-
tion with a marina to be constructed at a later date. It was
subsequently determined that the actual purpose of the dredge
operation was to fill in the marshes part of a waterfront hous-
ing subdivision. The local authorities, the State Department
of Public Works and the Army Corps of Engineers initially
approved the proposal, but the Director of Marine Fisheries
objected, declaring that the protection of marine fisheries and
preservation of the ecological components in the estuarine
area required that no fill material be placed in the marsh.
There was no objection to the proposed channel or basin.
The company, ignoring the agency's orders, began filling
portions of the marsh. The Commissioner of Natural Re-
sources and the Director of Marine Fisheries obtained an in-
junction to prevent the company from continuing its fill oper-
ation and to compel it to reijove the fill material already
placed in Broad Marsh in violation of the permit conditions.
The trial judge made four general findings of fact and law:
(1) that the fill restriction was authorized by the legislation;
(2) that Broad Marsh was a salt marsh necessary to preserve
and protect marine fisheries; (3) that legislation itself was
valid; and (4) that the fill restriction imposed upon the com-
pany was not a taking of property without due process of law
entitling it to compensation."
On appeal, before the state supreme judicial court, find-
ings (1) and (2) of the trial judge were accepted since they
were not "plainly wrong." The court also apparently agreed
with finding (3) since it stated that the protection of marine
fisheries was a public purpose and thus within the purview of
the legislature. The major portion of the Volpe case, there-
fore, was concerned with item (4), the matter of substantive
due process. The court stated that this issue depended on
whether or not there had been such a deprivation of practical
uses of a landowner's property as to be the equivalent of a
taking without compensation. The court applied principles
69. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., supra note 66, at 106,
206 N.E.2d at 668.
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of zoning law and placed particular emphasis to two factually
similar zoning cases, Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills7" and Dooley v. Town
Plan & Zoning Commission."
In the Morris County case, the New Jersey court declared
invalid a zoning restriction designed to preserve a swamp
area which acted as a wildlife refuge and detention area for
flood waters. The zoning ordinance prohibited certain pre-
scribed uses including dumping without a special permit from
local authorities. This effectively prevented the landowner, a
gravel pit operator, from making any beneficial use of the
land. Provisions which were too restrictive were thus deemed
"constitutionally unreasonable and confiscatory." 2  The
Dooley case involved a zoning regulation which established a
flood plain zone along a tidal stream and prohibited fill opera-
tions within that area. The court declared:
Where most of the value of a person's property has
to be sacrificed so that community welfare may be
served, and where the owner does not directly benefit
from the evil avoided.., the occasion is appropriate
for the exercise of eminent domain."
The uses permitted by the ordinance were impractical and the
owner established that the market value of the property would
be reduced to seventy-five percent. Accordingly, the Connecti-
cut court held the zoning ordinance to be unreasonable and
invalid."4
After discussing the Morris County and Dooley cases, the
court in Volpe declined to rule on whether prescribed restric-
tions against filling amount to taking of private property with-
out compensation, but instead remanded the case back to the
lower court for the taking of further evidence on such matters
as the amount of land below the mean high water marks sub-
ject to filling, the uses which could be made of the land in its
70. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
71. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
72. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, supra note 70, at 556-57, 193 A.2d at 242.
73. Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, supra note 71, at 311-12, 197
A.2d at 774.
74. A previous case, Vartela. v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153
A.2d 822 (1959), had upheld similar legislation.
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natural state independently or in conjunction with the prop-
erty of another, the assessed value of the land in the past five
years, the cost of the property to the owner, and the fair
market value of the land subject to the restrictions and free of
such limitations. 5 There was speculation that the ultimate
response to these issues upon the return of the case to the ap-
pellate court would resolve unanswered questions concerning
the constitutionality of wetland protection laws.76 The regula-
tory agency, however, having encountered a highly unfavor-
able trial judge upon the remand of the case, decided to drop
the matter."'
As a test of the general validity of the legislative regula-
tion of dredge and fill operations, the Volpe case must be re-
garded as somewhat inconclusive. Its primary significance
lies in the court's reliance on zoning as a model for deter-
mining the reasonable restrictions of the use of land and the
court's enumeration of those facts it considered relevant to
the issue of reasonableness.
Soon afterward the constitutionality of dredge and fill
regulation again came before the Massachusetts court in Mac-
Gibbon v,. Board of Appeals of Duxbury,7" although the case
involved a local zoning ordinance rather than state legislation.
In 1962 the plaintiffs applied to the Duxbury Board of Ap-
peals for a special permit to fill portions of their land. The
property in question was comprised of approximately seven
acres of shoreland, parts of which were subject to periodic
flooding as a result of tidal action. Filling was necessary to
enable the land to meet the minimum requirements relating to
height above mean sea level and to comply with drainage regu-
lations. Both conditions were prerequisites to the granting
of a building permit. The local zoiaing board, however, denied
the special permit application because the plaintiffs had pre-
sented no evidence that their land could be filled and used for
75. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., suprar note 66, at 111-
12, 206 N.E.2d at 671-72.
76. 1 HEYMAN, POWERS: REGULATION-LEGAL QUESTIONS 33-35, 75 (Report
Prepared for San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commis-
sion 1968).
77. Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 351 (1970).
78. 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
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residential purposes without constituting a hazard to the
health of the community.7" The landowner appealed to the
superior court, which upheld the action of the board, but
whose decision was reversed on appeal by the supreme judicial
court."
In its opinion the court stated that the board's action must
be responsive to the landowner's petition and its decision must
contain a "definite statement of rational causes and motives,
founded upon adequate findings."'" The court also declared
that denial of the fill permit because the land was unsuitable
for residential construction or for the construction of septic
tanks was improper since the plaintiff's petition did not allege
that they intended to engage in residential construction. In
other words, the board was to consider only the propriety of
the fill operation itself and not the ultimate objective of the
landowners. In its brief the board argued that the proposed
fill operation would harmfully alter drainage patterns in the
area. The court agreed that this allegation, if substantial,
might constitute a proper basis for denial of the permit, but
noted that the board had taken no evidence on this matter in
its proceedings below. Accordingly, the court reversed the
board's decision and directed it to reconsider the plaintiff's
application in light of whatever information later might be
forthcoming on this issue. Subsequently, the plaintiffs again
applied for a special permit, this time limiting their applica-
tion to four separate areas of 10,000 square feet each. The
local board again denied the permit application and its action
was again upheld by the superior court. The supreme judicial
79. The decision states:
"(The plaintiffs] have presented no evidence that *** [their] land
could, in fact, be filled and used for residential purposes without
constituting a hazard to the health of the community. The marsh
* * * [on which the plaintiffs' lots are located] is below the water
level at high water * * * . As Duxbury has no system of sanitary
sewage disposal, in the opinion of the [b]oard this land is not
suitable for installation of a cesspool or septic tank because little
or no drainage will be provided for a leaching field. An inadequate
leaching field will cause a direct health menace, not only to the
occupants of the land in question, but to the entire surrounding
residential area."
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 691, 200 N.E.2d
254, 255 (1964).
80. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254
(1964).
81. Id. at 692, 200 N.E.2d at 256.
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court on appeal a second time held the board's action to be
invalid. 2
The zoning ordinance itself was held to be proper and the
court also held that the zoning ordinance contained adequate
standards to guide the board in the exercise of its powers. In
considering the board's denial of the permit application, the
court declared that the board's decision would not be disturbed
unless it was based on a legally untenable ground or was un-
reasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Since the
board had again failed to indicate factual grounds for its
decision, however, the court was compelled to remand the
matter back for further proceedings. Because the permit ap-
plication was returned to the board for further consideration,
the court did not decide whether the denial of the plaintiff's
permit application constituted a taking of property without
just compensation. The court did state that the town could not
under the guise of its zoning power preserve privately owned
land for public benefit:
The preservation of privately owned land in its
natural, unspoiled state for the enjoyment and bene-
fit of the public by preventing the owner from using
it for any practical purpose is not within the scope
and limits of any power or authority delegated to
municipalities under the Zoning Enabling Act ....
If such preservation of wetlands was the board's
sole objective, it was a legally untenable ground for
its decision.
The technical basis for the court's decision in the Mac-
Gibbon cases appears to be that no authority to protect wet-
land areas for conservation or aesthetic purposes had been
delegated to municipal governments under the general legis-
lative grant of zoning authority, although the court found
that the Zoning Enabling Act did permit municipalities to
prohibit residential construction on wetlands which would
endanger the health and safety of the occupants thereof.
82. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, supra note 78.
83. Id. at 640-41, 255 N.E.2d at 351 (citation omitted).
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Less than a year later in Golden v. Board of Selectmen
of Falmouth," the Massachusetts court apparently receded
from its holding in MacGibbon and upheld the denial of a
special permit under the provisions of the 1963 state wetlands
protection act discussed earlier in connection with the Volpe
case. The plaintiff, the owner of a tract of land extending
from the edge of a pond through a tidal marsh to upland prop-
erty, applied for a special permit to construct a twenty-four
foot wide channel in which to dock his two boats. The munici-
pal board of selectmen, acting under the provisions of the
state act, denied the permit application even though the state
director of marine resources had approved the proposal. The
plaintiff appealed the board's decision to the superior court,
which ruled that the board had exceeded its authority in re-
fusing to grant the special permit.
The case turned on the issue of whether the Massachusetts
wetlands protection act permitted local authorities to deny
permits despite approval of the undertaking by the state
Director of Marine Resources. The judge of the superior
court held that the statute did not permit boards of selectmen
to regulate local coastal wetlands once action by the Director
had been taken. The supreme judicial court, however, de-
clared that the state statute did not preclude the board from
also exercising control over wetland areas within its juris-
diction. It determined that the state zoning enabling legisla-
tion conferred the power upon municipalities to regulate the
use of wetlands independently of the provisions of the state
wetlands protection act. The court concluded that the board
had the power to deny the permit as long as its decision was
not "based on a legally untenable ground" or was not "un-
reasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary"," the standard
applied in the MacGibbon case. The court stated, "There is
nothing before us showing that the board's decision did not
comply with this standard.""8 The Golden case represents a
remarkable departure from the second MacGibbon case. Since
the landowner had not filed a brief, apparently no one raised
84. 265 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1970).
85. Id. at 576. See also MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, supra
note 78, at 639, 255 N.E.2d at 350.
86. Id.
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the question of whether the protection of wetlands constituted
a "legally tenable ground" under the state zoning enabling act;
the MacGibbon case had indicated that it was not. The zoning
ordinance in the Golden case stated that its purpose was "to
provide for the reasonable protection ad conservation of cer-
tain irreplaceable natural features, resources and amenities
for the benefit and welfare of the present and future inhabi-
tants of the Town."87 This language contains no references
to health or safety but resembles those very objectives the
court in MacGibbon held not to be within the purview of the
Zoning Enabling Act." Nor did court in Golden inquire into
the reasons for the board's denial of the plaintiff's permit.
In a footnote to the opinion the board is quoted as denying
the permi.t application because the "special permit would not
be providing for the reasonable protection and conservation
of the natural resources and features of the Town."" If this
is the only basis for the board's decision, it hardly comports
with the requirement of a "definite statement of rational
causes and motives, founded upon adequate findings" im-
posed upon the local authorities by the court in the first Mac-
Gibbon case.9"
The court never really adequately resolved the question of
substantive due process. The intent of the ordinance was
manifestly to protect a public interest and yet no considera-
tion was given to the matter of whether alternative uses were
available to the landowner or whether "there has been such
a deprivation of the pxactical uses of a landowner's property
as to be the equivalent of a taking without compensation." 9'
In all fairness to the court, however, it must be mentioned
that the lower court had based its decision solely on the pre-
emption issue and thus it is possible that the substantive due
process matter was never properly raised.
It is difficult to assess the significance of the Golden de-
cision at this time. On one hand the case appears to hold that
87. Id. at 575 n. 3.
88. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A (Cum. Supp. 1971).
89. Golden v. Board of Selectmen at Falmouth, supra note 84, at 575 n. 3.
90. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, supra note 80, at 692, 200
N.E.2d at 256.
91. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., supra note 66, at
108, 206 N.E.2d at 669.
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municipalities, through the use of their zoning power, can
regulate wetland areas independently of state efforts provided
that the local restrictions are more stringent than those of the
state agency. On the other hand it is uncertain whether Golden
represents a gradual change in judicial attitude from the
concern for property rights exhibited in Volpe to a greater
tolerance of public regulation in wetland areas since, strictly
speaking, the question of an uncompensated taking was not
raised. Nevertheless, the Golden case wotld seem to justify
a mood of cautious optimism by the proponents of dredge and
regulation through the use of the police power.
B. Maine
Maine's wetlands protection act, enacted in 1967, has also
established a state agency to regulate dredge and fill opera-
tions.2 The Act provides:
No person, agency or municipality shall remove, fill,
dredge, or otherwise alter any coastal wetland, or
drain or deposit sanitary sewage into or on any coas-
tal wetland . . without first obtaining a valid
permit.9
Permit applications, including appropriate plans and other
data, must be filed with local officials as well as with the Wet-
lands Control Board. 4 Local officials are required to conduct
a hearing on the matter and communicate the results to the
state board." The statute defines coastal wetlands as any
swamp, marsh, beach, flat or other contiguous lowland above
extreme low water which is subject to tidal action or normal
storm flowage at any time, excepting periods of maximum
storm activity."3 Permits are issued by municipal authorities
subject to the approval of the state agency and either govern-
mental authority may impose conditions on the proposed
92. "The Wetlands Control Board shall be composed of the Commissioners of
Sea and Shore Fisheries and of Inland Fisheries and Game, the Chairman
of the Environmental Improvement Commission, the Chairman of the State
Highway Commission, the Forest Commissioner and the Commissioner of
Health and Welfare or their delegates." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 12, §4705
(Supp. 1972).
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §4701 (Supp. 1972).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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operation." Appeal may be taken to the superior court if the
permit application is denied or conditions are imposed so as
to unreasonably restrict the use of the property. 8
The leading case interpreting the Maine statute is State
v. Johnson.9 The plaintiffs owned a tract of land about 220
feet wide and 700 feet long extending across salt water
marshes near a tidal river. The landowner's permit applica-
tion was denied by the state board because the proposed fill-
ing would "threaten the public health and would be damaging
to the conservation of wildlife and estuarine and marine fish-
eries."' 00 The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the board's
action constituted an unreasoable exercise of the police power
and a taking of their property without just compensation. In
Johnson v. Maine Wetlands Control Board the court had re-
manded the case for further findings of fact.1"' However, the
plaintiffs proceeded with their dredge and fill operation in
the absence of the necessary permit and the board sought in-
junctive relief. The trial court found that the property was a
part of a salt marsh area, a valuable natural resource of the
state; that the highest and best use for the land if filled would
be residential; and that unfilled it had no commercial value.
Thereupon an appeal was again taken to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine which declared that these findings were sup-
ported by evidence and were conclusive. The court also upheld
the legislation against the allegation that the standards by
which the landowner's proposal must be measured were un-
constitutionally vague. '
In its discussion of substantive due process, the court
examined the Wetlands Act in light of zoning case law. The
court stated that the government in the exercise of its police
power may regulate the use of property and if the owner suf-
fers injury normally it will be regarded as damnum absque
injuria or he will be considered to have been compensated by
sharing in the general benefits which the regulations were in-
97. Id. §4702.
98. Id. §4704.
99. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
100. Johnson v. Maine Wetlands Control Board, 250 A.2d 825, 826 (Me. 1969).
101. Id. at 825.
102. State v. Johnson, eupra note 99.
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tended to secure. Quoting from Pennsylvania Coal Company
v. Mahon,' however, the court declared that the magnitude
of diminution in value may at times be sufficient to compel the
government to utilize its power of eminent domain instead
of regulating under the police power:
One fact for consideration in determining such limits
is the extent of the dimunition. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there
must be a exercise of eminent domain and compen-
sation to sustain the act.'
The court cited with approval the Dooley, Morris County,
Volpe and MacGibbon decisions and remarked:
[T]he Massachusetts cases are of particular signifi-
cance inasmuch :, the "dredge and fill" Act dis-
cussed in Volpe is u.\pressed in terms closely parallel
to our Wetlands Act and the zoning ordinance in
MacGibbon deals with facts closely akin to those
before us.10
Significi rifly, the court declared that the preservation of wet-
lands, a valuable natural resource of the state, was a matter
of state-wide rather than local concern. Since the benefits
from the preservation of the wetlands extended beyond the
municipal limits, the immediate benefit to the individual
landowner was minimal in comparison with the inconvenience
imposed upon him. Therefore, the court concluded, "[T]heir
[the landowners'] compensation by sharing in the benefits
which this restriction is intended to secure is so dispropor-
tionate to their deprivation of reasonable use that such exer-
cise of the State's police power is unreasonable. "" The John-
son case clearly relied on the rationale of the Massachusetts
decisions discussed earlier in this article. However, it should
be noted that the Golden ease had not yet been decided when
the Johnson case came before the Maine court. It is signifi-
cant that the act itself and therefore the principle of police-
power-controls over privately-owned wetland areas was up-
held.
103. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
104. Id. at 413.
105. State v. Johnson, supra note 99, at 716.
106. Id.
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C. California
In 1965 the California legislature established the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
(BCDC) and directed it to make a detailed study of the bay,
and on the basis of the study, to prepare a comprehensive and
enforceable plan for the conservation of the waters of the bay
and the development of its shoreline."0 7 The jurisdiction of
BCDC extends to San Francisco Bay itself, to diked salt
ponds and over managed wetlands surrounding the bay, to
certain tidal waterways, and to an area extending 100 feet land-
ward from the shoreline. 10 8
The legislation also provides that any person or govern-
mental agency wishing to place fill or to extract matter, or
to make any substantial change in use of any water, land, or
structure within the commission's jurisdiction must secure a
permit from it and if necessary from any city or county with-
in which any part of the work is to be performed.0 9 If a per-
mit is also required by local authorities, they must hold a
hearing on the matter and transmit a report to the commis-
sion; the commission itself must then hold further hearings."'
The legislation also states:
A permit shall be granted for a project if the com-
mission finds and declares that the project is either
(1) necessary to the health, safety or welfare of the
public in the entire bay area, or (2) of such a nature
that it will be consistent with the provisions of this
title and with the provisions of the San Francisco
Bay Plan then in effect."'
The commission may attach conditions to the granting of
the permit. Also, the commission will be deemed to have
granted a permit if it fails to take action on the application
within the prescribed period.11 No specific procedure is pro-
vided for judicial review of the commission's action, but the
107. Note, Saving San Francisco Bay: A Case Study in Environmental Legisla-
tion, 23 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1971).
108. CAL. Govw. CODE §66610 (West Supp. 1972).
109. Id. §66632.
110. Id. §66632(b) and (c).
111. Id. §66632(f).
112. Id.
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statute requires proceedings to be brought within ninety days
of such action.1 '
In Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission,"4 the California
court upheld the constitutionality of controls imposed over
San Francisco Bay. The plaintiff owned a parcel of land
submerged at high tide by the waters of San Francisco Bay,
but not under navigable waters. This property was adjoined
by other parcels which had either been filled or were in the
process of being filled. The owner's application for a permit
to deposit fill from construction projects was approved by
municipal and county authorities but denied by the Bay Con-
servation and Development Commission. Thereupon, the
landowner filed an action in the superior court for manda-
mus, or in the alternative, damages for an alleged taking of
his property without just compensation. The plaintiff, how-
ever, was denied relief on both counts. A state intermediate
appellate court sustained the commission's action against a
variety of arguments raised by the landowner."' On the issue
of substantive due process, the court held that the denial of the
permit did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty in so doing adopted a fairly broad view of the state's
police power:
The police power of a state is an indispensable per-
ogative of sovereignty and one that is not to be lightly
limited. Indeed, even though at times its operation
may seem harsh, the imperative necessity for its exis-
tence precludes any limitation upon its exercise save
that it be not unreasonably and arbitrarily invoked
and applied."'
113. Id. §66632(j).
114. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
115. In addition to the substantive due process issue, the plaintiffs argued: (1)
the Hunter's Point Reclamation District Act prevented BCDC from re-
stricting dredge and fill operations within the Hunter's Point District; (2)
the permit was deemed to be granted because the District failed to act on
it within 60 days as required by CAL. GOVT. CODE §66632(d) ; (3) that the
use of proxies under CAL. GOVT. CODE §66632 was an unlawful delegation
of power; (4) that a quorum was not present when the plaintiff's permit
application was denied; and (5) the plaintiff was denied procedural due
process when it was not allowed to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
116. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission, supra note 114, at 570-71, 89 Cal Rptr. at 905.
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It should be noted that California courts have gone be-
yond those of any other state in sustaining the validity of
zoning regulations against constitutional attack." 7 The leading
case i~s Lockard v. City of Los Angeles."' Two other cases,
McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach".. and Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles... represent the
outer limits of the police power. The plaintiffs in McCarthy
owned a substantial strip of oceanfront property. In 1941 the
city zoned the land for beach recreational activities, the only
property in the area so restricted. This action was upheld by
the courts despite the fact that the plaintiff's taxes were $9000
per year on the property and it had never been employed in a
profitable use. In the Consolidated Rock case, cited as au-
thority in Candlestick, property of great value for gravel
excavation purposes was restricted to agricultural and residen-
tial use. The property was located adjacent to another mining
operation and was remote from land used for other purposes.
Although the land was admittedly worthless for any use but
mining, the trial court applied the fairly debatable test'' and
sustained the zoning ordinance. This decision was upheld on
appeal.
The court in the Candlestick case indicated that the legis-
lation must be sustained if there was any reasonable basis in
fact to support the legislative determination of the regula-
tion's wisdom and necessity. The court determined that re-
citals in the legislation's declaration of policy provided such
a basis:
In those sections the Legislature has determined that
the bay is the most valuable single natural resource
of the entire region and changes in one part of the bay
may also affect all other parts; that the present un-
coordinated, haphazard manner in which the bay is
being filled threatens the bay itself and is therefore
inimical to the welfare of both present and future
residents of the bay area; and that a regional ap-
117. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW §117 at 213
(1971).
118. 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949).
119. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
120. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
121. The use of the fairly debatable test in the Consolidated Rock case has been
criticized. See HAGMAN, supra note 117, §118 at 216 n. 33.
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proach is necessary to protect the public interest in
the bay.'22
The court also invoked the fairly debatable test of zoning
law to support its conclusion that the regulation was valid.12
On the issue of whether the application of the regulation to
the particular plaintiff might not constitute a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law, the court, while recognizing
that some police power regulations might be unconstitutional,
did not review the evidence at all, but simply concluded that
the regulation did not amount to an undue restriction on the
plaintiff's property. The Dooley and Morris County cases
were distinguished; the former because no use at all could be
made of the land, and the latter because private property was
in effect being used as a flood water detention area and open
space.'24
Obviously the court in the Candlestick case felt that the
plaintiff had not been deprived of all practical uses of his
land, and yet this aspect was not discussed in the same detail
as it had been in the Volpe and MacGibbon cases. Indeed,
these cases were not even mentioned. The Johnson case had
arisen only a few months before, and the Golden case was not
yet decided. Earlier in its opinion, the court had noted that
the property was originally purchased for $40,000 and that it
contained the remnants of ship hulls.12 The plaintiff main-
tained that the submerged land had no value except as a place
to deposit fill or as filled land. The board disputed the accu-
racy of this allegation but conceded that no information had
been placed on the record regarding alternative uses of the
property.
It is still too early to tell if Candlestick will mark the
beginning of a trend toward greater judicial tolerance of
122. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission, supra note 114, at 571-72, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
123. It has become traditional in many states to test the reasonableness of a
zoning ordinance by the "fairly debatable" standards. The ordinance is
considered to be fairly debatable and, therefore, reasonable "when for any
reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or
point to a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional
validity." City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953),
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
124. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission, supra note 114, at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
125. Id. at 562, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
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dredge and fill regulations. Even though California cases in
the zoning area are not illustrative of the weight of authority,
it appears that at the moment at least Candlestick and Golden
represent the prevailing view.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the meager case law available, no final conclu-
sions can be drawn from the experience of wetlands protection
legislation in Massachusetts, Maine and California. However,
a few tenative findings can perhaps be suggested.
First of all, the protection of wetlands by means of re-
strictions over dredge and fill operations has met with judicial
approval. To date no wetlands protection statute has been
held invalid on its face; instead the courts in Volpe, Golden,
Johnison and Candlestick all specifically held such legislation
to be within the scope of the state police power. It appears
that this authority may be delegated to local government
bodies by means of appropriate enabling legislation. These
cases also support the premise that legislation which seeks to
control similar activities in other classes of nonnavigable
waters will be sustained if it is supported by an adequate
legislative declaration of policy.
Secondly, no challenge based on grounds of a denial of
procedural due process under dredge and fill control statutes
has succeeded.126 Regulatory legislation, however, should pro-
vide for administrative hearings concerning permit applica-
tions at which all relevant data can be placed on the record.
Such administrative findings of fact, thus established, could
assist the courts in sustaining the validity of regulatory
action. Judicial review should also be available.
Finally, it is clear that the question of whether a taking
of property without compensation has occurred will be deter-
mined by reference to the principles of the law of zoning.'27
It seems that similar matters are involved in flood plain zon-
126. The only serious challenge on procedural due process appears to have been
raised in Candlestick.
127. Cf. Deloger, Land Use Control Principles Applied to Offshore Coastal
Waters 59 KENTUCKY L. J. 606 (1971).
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ing and other types of regulations to control the use of open
space. Cases arising out of such restrictive devices should
have considerable relevance to dredge and fill legislation,
particularly with respect to the issue of substantive due
process. The cases reviewed in this article suggest at least
two important factors, diminution in value and public use.
The United States Supreme Court declared in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Company v. Mahon.2 that diminution in the value
of the property is a significant element in the substantive due
process issue. The Mahon case was cited with approval in the
Volpe, MacGibbon, Johnson, and Candlestick cases. In princi-
ple at least, the owner must be left with some reasonably prac-
tical (and profitable) use of his property."9 Thus, it would
appear that while state regulation of dredge and fill opera-
tions is feasible, and indeed desirable, there will be situations
in which eminent domain will be called for. It follows, there-
fore, that the statute should provide for payment of compen-
sation in cases where the regulation amounts to a taking of
property. An alternative to this might be the inclusion of a
"'variance " provision. This would mitigate the severity of the
regulations in cases where no other profitable use could be
made while still providing for exercise of eminent domain.
Another significant factor is the extent to which the
plaintiff's land is forced to serve a public purpose. Both the
MacGibbon and Johnson cases dealt with this matter and con-
cluded that the land in question was being so converted and
accordingly an exercise of eminent domain power was called
for."' The same issue arose in the Dooley"' case where flood
plain zoning was involved.1"2 Clearly, this could cause a
serious problem in the case of dredge and fill restrictions
imposed for conservation or recreational purposes.
The boundary between proper exercise of the police power
and a taking of private property is frequently ill-defined and
128. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
129. See Averne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
130. See also Bartlet v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Old Lyme, 161 Conn.
24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971).
131. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
132. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of flood plain zoning see
generally, Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1098 (1959); 4 NAT. RES. J. 445 (1965).
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uncertain. In addition, judicial standards of permissible
regulation vary somewhat from state to state.
Nevertheless, some regulatory authority over dredge and
fill operations in small lakes and streams as well as fresh
water and tidal wetlands is desirable and, in many cases, essen-
tial. As discussed previously in this article, private law
remedies based on nuisance and riparian rights principles are
frequently inadequate. Statutory controls may take the form
of a regulatory scheme directly administered by a state agency,
or this function may be delegated to local governmental au-
thorities by amendment to existing zoning enabling legisla-
tion. In any event, reference to the comparatively settled
principles of zoning law should provide a standard by which
questions of substantive due process can be determined with
a minimum of inconvenience and expense to the litigants.
